Here’s something I’ve been thinking about for some time.
It’s something I call The Paradox of Tolerating Intolerance, and arises because there seem to be two correct, but mutually exclusive, ways of completing the following sentence:
Tolerating intolerance promotes …
The two positions:
- Position A) Tolerating intolerance promotes tolerance
- Position B) Tolerating intolerance promotes intolerance
Let’s say there’s a conversation between Alice and Bob.
Alice says something that expresses intolerance towards some kind of outgroup, of which neither Alice nor Bob are members. Bob does not hold the intolerant position towards this outgroup that Alice expressed.
If Bob objects to Alice’s intolerance, he would be acting according to Position B.
If Bob does not object to Alice’s intolerance, he would be acting according to Position A.
In not objecting, Bob would himself be acting with tolerance, which could be seen as a promoting tolerance. But at the same time the lack of objection could lead Alice to believe her intolerant views are more widely held than they are, to implicitly be seen to condone and normalise such views, meaning Alice is more likely to continue to hold and express such views in the future. So Bob’s action (or inaction) of not objecting could also be seen to promote intolerance (Position B).
By contrast, if Bob objects to Alice, the direct act of objecting to an intolerant view being expressed is itself an act of intolerance: Alice believed Bob was someone with whom she could speak freely and honestly. But Bob’s act of censuring Alice’s expression of her views means she may now no longer consider Bob someone about whom she can speak freely and honestly. At the same time, the fact and experience of being censured over her views may cause Alice to question her views - and her rationale for intolerance - more carefully, as well as reassess how commonly held she considers her position to be. If Bob is one of Alice’s friends, but Bob does not hold the same intolerant position that Alice holds, perhaps other friends of Alice, Bob, or both will tend not to hold that position too?
So, Position A seems to be something like a first order act of tolerance, because Bob is accepting of (if not supporting of) Alice’s position; but potentially also a second order act of intolerance, because it causes Alice to feel more confident and assured both in having and expressing her intolerant view.
By contrast Position B seems the opposite: a first order act of intolerance, because Bob explicitly opposes Alice, but potentially a second order act of tolerance, if it causes Alice to reevaluate her positions on both having and expressing an intolerant viewpoint.
To re-iterate: this really does seem to be a paradox. There’s no right answer. But at the same time, whichever position a person holds - Position A or Position B - that person would not really be acting with any kind of moral consistency if they were to switch positions randomly: there are probably Position A people, and Position B people.
So, if both positions are internally consistent, and there’s no outside factor that ‘proves’ one position is better than the other, then what determines whether someone tends towards Position A or Position B?
Personality is surely going to be a factor. For example, the act of openly disagreeing with someone may be easier for someone with higher disagreeability (almost by definition), lower neuroticism 1, and possibly higher conscientiousness than the converse. On the other hand, the (in)act of not disagreeing when encountering views that are both intolerant and contrary to one’s own could be due to higher openness - more curiousity about how others think and reason about the world. Or it could due to more long-term/strategic thinking about how best to engage with someone who holds intolerant positions: Instead of openly disagreeing and censuring someone immediately for saying something intolerant, it may be (from experience) more effective to initially say nothing, but then ask a series of questions that, hopefully, lead the person expressing such views to be more introspective and self-questioning about why they hold such views, which may then lead them to genuinely change their mind. This is what might be called the third order effect of adopting Position A as opposed to Position B when encountering intolerance.
Another complex of factors is likely to be cultural. In particular, the changing implicit norms and mores that change and shift over time (period effects), and the norms and mores that were predominant around formative periods in individuals’ cultural and attitudinal development: such as childhood and (in particular) early adulthood (i.e. cohort effects). As well as age effects (there may be views that are easier to hold while young than while old, and vice versa), period and cohort effects in cultural exposure could also be important factors in shaping whether someone tends more towards Position A or Position B, and the relative share of Position A and Position B behaviours expressed within the overall population, and population strata.
My own default is quite strongly towards Position A: Tolerating intolerance promotes tolerance. But anecdotally I sense there’s been a cultural shift towards Position B: Tolerating intolerance promotes intolerance. My guess is such a shift occurred around the 2010s, and has both period and cohort (generational) components to it, with those who entered adulthood over the 2010s showing perhaps the most pronounced shift towards Position B tendencies as compared with earlier generations of young adults.
From my own Position A default a shift towards a Position B default has felt like something of a retrograde step towards genuinely addressing and ameliorating intolerance and prejudice. My intuition is that Position A is not only acting tolerantly from a first order perspective (I am acting with tolerance), but also from a third order perspective: allowing a place for intolerance to be expressed is giving a space for the roots, reasoning and habits of thought that gave rise to intolerant attitudes having developed, and so a space for critical enquiry along broadly Socratic lines - as to why someone believes what they believe, and what would have to change for them to believe (and act) otherwise - to take place.
However, just as I believe much of the evolving default towards Position B may have been culturally influenced - the position held being a function of the salient norms of time and place - I can’t claim my own strong preference towards Position A is really derived deductively from first principles, or objectively proven to be superior, either. I’m just as much a product of nature and nurture, and the complex interplay and ongoing negotiation between the two, as anyone else. I believe and hope that acting according to my Position A instincts tends to be the better strategy when it comes to promoting tolerance, especially when considering higher order effects, but ultimately, that’s all it is: belief and hope.
Footnotes
The opposite argument could also be made regarding this factor: someone may find an intolerant position held by someone so inherently noxious that they will be willing to do anything to avoid being exposed to it, whether that be walking out (or logging off) from a conversation with a proponent of such a postion, through to speaking out almost in instinct against it. And so the driver of speaking out could be high neuroticism, not low, where in this case (and many others) neuroticism should really be thought of as something like ‘threat sensitivity’, and for the listener the speaker’s intolerant position is genuinely perceived as an acute threat, akin to a violent act.↩︎