Works in Progress Issues 19-21 Discussion
Session: 7 February 2026 Context: Preparation for a Rationalist discussion group, covering three articles from Works in Progress magazine. The discussion ranged well beyond the articles into historical parallels, epistemological questions, and meta-themes about institutional design.
Source Articles
- Albrecht - How to Spot a Monopoly (2025) — Argues the Olley-Pakes decomposition is a better competition metric than concentration ratios or markups
- Tabarrok - Rivers Are Now Battlefields (2025) — China’s dam infrastructure creates coercive leverage over billions downstream; proposes desalination as bypass
- Martin - How to Redraw a City (2025) — Japanese land readjustment as a mechanism for reorganising urban land without expropriation
Core Propositions
On competition and monopoly
- The Olley-Pakes decomposition is better than concentration ratios but has fundamental blind spots
- Static and dynamic efficiency can trade off against each other
- Bell Labs’ greatest output came during monopoly, not competition
- Network goods structurally resist competitive provision
- Splitting a national monopoly into regional ones produces the worst of both worlds
- Victorian railway competition produced waste, not efficiency
On water and geopolitics
- Control of transboundary water has become a primary instrument of geopolitical coercion
- Technology inverted the strategic value of elevation from defensive to offensive
- Desalination could bypass upstream leverage, but the coast-to-hinterland gap is vast
On cities and land
- Land readjustment offers a third way, but depends on conditions that may not transfer
- Geographic constraint drives institutional innovation in land management
- Cyclical rebuilding preserves embodied knowledge and enables incremental adaptation
- The tension between designed and grown order recurs across markets, cities, and geopolitics
Cross-cutting themes
- Institutional mechanisms for shared resources work only when the game can be made positive-sum
- The gap between potential and actual Pareto improvement is where most real politics happens
- Goodhart and Campbell converged independently as the adjacent possible ripened
- Convergent discovery reflects the adjacent possible
- The Hayekian knowledge problem is epistemic, not computational
- Web 2.0 platforms create and shape demand, not just reveal it
- Post-2008 UK productivity stagnation reflects failed reallocation
Discussion Arc
The conversation began with article summaries and critique, then developed through several thematic arcs:
Arc 1: The monopoly article’s ideological centre of gravity. The Olley-Pakes framework was challenged as having an economist-liberal bias — trying to salvage the principle of competition rather than recognising that good service doesn’t necessarily require it. The AT&T/Bell Labs case proved central: the monopoly period produced extraordinary innovation while scoring poorly on the decomposition. This led to the distinction between static and dynamic efficiency and the recognition that for network goods, the question is governance, not competition.
Arc 2: Historical parallels in railways and telecoms. Victorian railway competition, the AT&T breakup, and UK rail privatisation all demonstrated that competition in network infrastructure produces waste, and the market’s own resolution is consolidation toward monopoly. The full arc — competition → waste → consolidation → nationalisation → privatisation → dysfunction → reconsolidation — undermines any simple narrative about competition as universally beneficial.
Arc 3: Geographic constraint and institutional innovation. Why Japan developed land readjustment and Britain didn’t may be better explained by geographic constraint (73% mountainous) than by culture. This connected to the Nile (Egypt’s narrow floodplain producing centralised resurveying), America’s abundant land enabling sprawl, and Britain’s green belt producing constraint without a complementary reorganisation mechanism.
Arc 4: The Ise Shrine principle. The cyclical rebuilding of Ise Grand Shrine (every 20 years since the 7th century) preserves craft knowledge and enables incremental adaptation. Extended to urban planning, institutional design, and treaty structures: perhaps the question isn’t which structure is correct but how to build in periodic restructuring.
Arc 5: Pareto improvement and its limits. The gap between potential and actual Pareto improvement emerged as a meta-theme: each article proposes a positive-sum mechanism, but each involves potential losers whose compensation is uncertain.
Arc 6: Measurement, Goodhart, and the adjacent possible. Goodhart’s and Campbell’s Laws as convergent discovery through the adjacent possible. All three articles propose new metrics — each vulnerable to Goodharting if adopted as policy targets.
Arc 7: AI, Hayek, and preference formation. Whether AI enables central planning was explored and largely rejected: the Hayekian objection is epistemic, not computational. But the deeper question is whether platforms create rather than reveal demand, which undermines the foundations of both market and planning-based systems.
Questions Worth Pondering
-
Legibility and blind spots. Each article makes a system legible for intervention (Olley-Pakes, land value, water dependency). What is each metric unable to see, and what are the consequences? (cf. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State)
-
Reform versus bypass. When is working within the existing structure right, and when is the whole framework the problem? Railways and telecoms suggest that sometimes the market structure itself is misconceived.
-
The Ise Shrine question. Should institutions be designed with explicit sunset clauses and rebuilding cycles? The Indus Waters Treaty (65 years), British Rail (45 years), AT&T (70 years) — all accumulated rigidity until catastrophic failure.
Unresolved Links and Future Seeds
These concepts were mentioned but not yet developed into full notes — they mark the edges of this session’s thinking and are candidates for future development:
- contestability — Suggested as the real framework for competition, rather than concentration or Olley-Pakes
- Williamson tradeoff — Oliver Williamson’s 1968 model of the market power vs efficiency trade-off
- Seeing Like a State — James C. Scott’s framework for how legibility-driven simplification destroys embedded knowledge
- Schumpeterian creative destruction — The argument that monopoly profits fund dynamic innovation
- enclosure as redistribution — English parliamentary enclosure as the canonical case of Kaldor-Hicks without compensation
- Galbraith dependence effect — The production system creating the wants it satisfies
- Lucas critique — Econometric relationships break down when used for policy
- Mandate of Heaven and water management — Chinese political legitimacy tied to hydrological control
- Cybersyn — Allende’s premature attempt at AI-assisted economic planning